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Abstract
Real effects of long-run inflation are studied in a standard matching model.
The sign and degree of the output-inflation correlation depend on the cause
of inflation and, more specifically, on how the underlying policy assigns money
among agents. The correlation may be negative and weak and may be posi-
tive and strong. Although inflation increases inequality in wealth, whether it
increases inequality or the social difference in welfare depends on the underlying
policy. The strong and positive output effect can be compatible with a steep and
positively sloped Phillips curve. Policy may be chosen in a way that inflation
improves both output and ex ante welfare and there is some base for such a
policy to be adopted by policy makers.
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1 Introduction
An influential view on long-run inflation is that it has little real effects as long as it
can be kept below some level. This view sees superneutrality as a good approximation
to reality. After all, empirical studies overwhelmingly support that the Phillips curve
is vertical or nearly vertical in the long run. Superneutrality, however, is questionable
for at least two reasons. First, evidence from other aggregates is not that clearly
cut. One aggregate of great importance is output; evidence on the long-run output-
inflation correlation is much mixed. In particular, the correlation may be positive in
some countries, including the U.S., when inflation is low; e.g., Ahmed and Rogers [1],
Bullard and Keating [5], and Rapach [20]. Second, it is not new that inflation would
have redistribution effects by different channels. A widespread narrative says that
inflation hurts poor people more than rich. As documented by Easterly and Fischer
[9], poor people are more concerned about inflation. Recently, a popular opinion points
to the contributing role of monetary policy for the growing inequality of wealth and
income. The opinion seems to reach central bankers; e.g., Bernanke [3], Bullard [4],
and Constaˆncio [6].
Here we study the long-run real effects of inflation in the model of Trejos and
Wright [25] and Shi [23] with general individual money holdings. This basic model of
the New Monetarist economics resembles much of the Bewley model, the workhorse
model to study inequality; it is attractive because of the following consideration. In
the Bewley model, agents accumulate wealth in spot markets to self-insure against
idiosyncratic shocks, shocks that affect the individual ability to earn labor incomes.
But the labor-income earning process in reality is rather decentralized, which may affect
the individual self-insuring capacity and its reaction to policies. Having agents trade
by pairs, the Trejos-Wright-Shi model permits us to explore potential consequences of
a decentralized income earning process against a simple background.
We begin with an abstract program that repeatedly transfers money to agents;
a transfer is either regressive or progressive and designed to meet a given inflation
target. The main findings are (a) both regressive and progressive transfers stretch
the distribution of wealth (i.e., increase inequality) with respect to the zero-transfer
benchmark; (b) stretching the distribution has a significant and positive effect on
output, as long as overall incentives to produce are maintained; (c) only a regressive
transfer can maintain overall incentives to uphold its redistribution effect; and (d)
if decentralized trade is replaced with centralized trade on spot markets as in the
Bewley model, both regressive and progressive transfers have much limited effects on
the distribution and output. Finding (b) is in line with a key finding by Jin and Zhu
[13] for one-shot transfers in the same model. One shot transfers alter the distribution
but barely alter incentives to produce. Repeated transfers alter both and findings (a),
(c) and (d) are all related to incentives.
The key to understand incentives is the individual consumption-production risk;
although each agent ultimately cares about his consumption stream, he needs to pro-
duce to support his consumption and randomness of production matters because the
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marginal disutility of working is not constant. A regressive transfer enhances the in-
dividual consumption-production risk as if having a concave transformation of the
value function of nominal wealth, a transformation that maintains overall incentives
to produce; a progressive transfer does the opposite and dilutes overall incentives.
The progressive transfer paradoxically stretches the distribution because of a general
equilibrium effect due to the reduction in the risk—agents dramatically raise their
expenditures. The regressive transfer actually discourages agents to spend but the
magnitude is much less dramatic, which may be understood on the base that absent
any transfer, the risk already sufficiently restrains spending. Centralized trade elim-
inates the constraint that how much an agent as a seller can adjust up his wealth is
subject to the wealth of his trading partner and, hence, greatly reduces the risk which,
in turn, limits the degrees of alteration by a transfer on the distribution and aggregate
output.
Next we show that financing interests of government bonds by inflation resembles
a regressive transfer and we extend the model with bonds in two directions. One
extension requires a seller, interpreted as a worker, to pay a cost before he can get
employed in the decentralized market. Inflation influences employment mainly through
redistributing potential buyers (employers) for the seller, which slightly undermines
the seller’s participation incentive because the seller prefers working for a buyer with
average wealth to a randomly-assigned buyer; so, in particular, inflation slightly raises
unemployment. But working hours still increase with inflation because the channel for
inflation to affect employment has little to do with either incentives of employed sellers
or the redistribution effect of inflation on aggregate output.
Another extension introduces a bond-based money-transfer program which can be
regressive, progressive, or hybrid—progressive among poor agents and regressive among
rich. Here we ask whether there is a base for agents in the zero-inflation steady state
to select an output-increasing inflation policy. We find that mild inflation generated
by a hybrid policy can increase output not at the cost of average welfare. In terms
of the individual response, the poor side of the society favors a insurance-providing
progressive policy; the rich side favors a regressive output-increasing policy; and the
poor side is much more sensitive to which policy may be selected. An output-increasing
hybrid policy may gain a ground because it reduces rich agents’ disfavoring degree to
a policy that insures poor agents.
With flexible prices, inflation tends to reduce output because it undercuts people’s
incentives to obtain money in most familiar models; e.g., the cash-in-advance model,
the shopping-time model, and the search-matching models of Lagos and Wright [16]
and Shi [24]. A prominent channel for inflation to affect inequality explored by the
literature is the consumption-tax channel—poor agents are hit harder by inflation
because they (endogenously) rely more on money in payments; see Erosa and Ventura
[10] for a leading study. Our contribution is to demonstrate by an off-the-shelf model
that with flexible prices, inflation need not undercut the overall incentives to obtain
money; it is practically easy to assign more of injected money to the rich even when
money is the unique payment method; and inflation policy can be far more important
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for the poor than the rich.
We describe the model with an abstract transfer program in section 2 and report
findings of quantitative analysis in section 3. The model with nominal bonds and its
extensions are studied in section 4. We discuss the related literature and some further
extensions of our work in section 5.
2 The model with direct money transfer
Time is discrete, dated as t ≥ 0. There is a unit mass of infinitely lived agents. There
exists a durable and intrinsically useless object, called money. Money is indivisible
and, without loss of generality, let its smallest unit be 1; the initial money stock is M ;
there is a finite but arbitrarily large upper bound B on the individual money holdings;
and the initial distribution of money pi0 is public information.
Each period t consists of two stages, 1 and 2. At stage 1, the government transfers
money to agents in form of lotteries; for an agent holding m units of money at the
start of the period, a lottery is a probability measure on the set {0, ..., B − m} such
that the measure of x is the probability for the agent to receive x units of money
from the government. Following Wallace [26], we characterize a transfer policy by a
pair of parameters (C0, C) ∈ R×R+: the lottery specified by the policy for the agent
holding m has the mean equal to min{max{0, C0+C ·m}, B−m} and has the minimal
variance.1
At stage 2, each agent has the equal chance to be a buyer or a seller. Following
the type realization, each seller is randomly matched with a buyer. In each pairwise
meeting, the seller can produce a good only consumed by the buyer. The good is
divisible and perishes at the end of the period. By exerting l units of the labor input,
each seller can produce y = l units of goods. A trading outcome in the meeting is a
lottery on the feasible transfers of goods and money. Without loss of generality, we
represent a generic trading outcome by a pair (y, µ), meaning that the seller transfers
y ≥ 0 units of goods with probability one (it is never optimal for agents to randomize
on the transfer of goods) and the buyer pays d ∈ {0, . . . ,min(mb, B − ms)} units of
money with probability µ(d). If the seller exerts l units of the labor input, his disutility
is
c (l) = l1+1/η/ (1 + 1/η) , η > 0. (1)
If the buyer consumes y units of goods produced by the seller, his period utility is
u (y) =
[
(y + ω)1−σ − ω1−σ
]
/ (1− σ) , σ > 0, (2)
where ω is a small positive number. The trading outcome is determined by the weighted
1The minimal variance is obtained when the support of the lottery is the two integers neighboring
the mean of the lottery if the mean is not an integer and the support is the mean otherwise. If money
is divisible and B = ∞, then the agent receives exactly max{0, C0 + C ·m} amount of money. All
lotteries used in this paper are also adopted by Jin and Zhu [13] to mitigate indivisibility of money.
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egalitarian solution of Kalai [14],2 where the buyer’s share of surplus is θ. Each agent
can observe his meeting partner’s money holdings.
At the end of date t, each unit of money independently disintegrates with the
probability δt = 1 −Mt/M
+
t , where Mt and M
+
t are the stocks of money before and
after the stage-1 transfer at period t, respectively; this disintegration turns the money
stock back to Mt and implies Mt = M , all t.
3 Each agent maximizes his expected
utility with a discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
To describe equilibrium conditions at period t, let vt+1(m) be the value for an agent
holding m units of money at the start of t + 1 and pit(m) be the proportion of agents
who hold m units of money at the start of t. Given the distribution pit, the proportion
of agents who hold m units of money right following the stage-1 money transfer is
pˆit (m) =
∑
m′
λt (m,m
′) pit (m
′) , (3)
where λt (m,m
′) is the proportion of agents with m′ units of money receiving m−m′
units of transferred money that is fully determined by the transfer policy (C0, C) and
is described in the appendix. Given the value function vt+1, the value function for an
agent holding m units of money right prior to the disintegration of money at the end
of period t is
v˜t (m) = β
∑
m′≤m
(
m
m′
)
(1− δt)
m′ δt
m−m′vt+1 (m
′) , (4)
where δt is the disintegration probability given M
+
t =
∑
mpˆit(m). Given the value
function v˜t, the trading outcome when a buyer holding m
b meets a seller holding ms
at stage 2 is (
yt
(
mb,ms
)
, µt
(
mb,ms
))
= argmax
(y,µ)
Sbt
(
y, µ,mb
)
(5)
subject to
θSst (y, µ,m
s) = (1− θ)Sbt
(
y, µ,mb
)
, (6)
where
Sbt
(
y, µ,mb
)
= u (y) +
∑
d
µ (d)
[
v˜t
(
mb − d
)
− v˜t
(
mb
)]
(7)
is the buyer’s surplus from trading (y, µ) and
Sst (y, µ,m
s) = −c (y) +
∑
d
µ (d) [v˜t (m
s + d)− v˜t (m
s)] (8)
2This bargaining protocol is applied to matching models of money by the recent literature because
it preserves concavity of value functions.
3The disintegration is introduced by Deviatov and Wallace [8] and also adopted by Jin and Zhu
[13] for the purpose to define the individual state by the normalized individual holdings of money,
i.e., the ratio of the individual money holdings to the stock of money. If money is divisible, then the
disintegration turns m units of money right after the transfer into m× (1− δt) units of money. Also,
notice that if B = ∞, then M+t = C0 + CM so δt does not depend on how money is distributed at
the start of t.
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is the seller’s. Given stage-2 meeting outcomes and the distribution pˆit, the value for
an agent holding m right prior to the stage-2 meetings is
vˆt (m) = v˜t (m) + 0.5
∑
m′
pˆit (m
′) [Sbt (yt (m,m
′) , µt (m,m
′) ,m) (9)
+ Sst (yt (m
′,m) , µt (m
′,m) ,m)];
the proportion of agents who hold m right prior to date-t disintegration of money is
p˜it (m) = 0.5
∑
mb,ms
[
λˆbt
(
m,mb,ms
)
+ λˆst
(
m,mb,ms
)]
pˆit
(
mb
)
pˆit (m
s) , (10)
where λˆbt(m,m
b,ms) and λˆst(m,m
b,ms) are the proportions of buyers with mb and
the proportion of sellers with ms, respectively, ending up with m after those buyers
meeting those sellers that are fully determined by the payment lottery µ(mb,ms) and
are described in the appendix. Finally, the value for an agent holding m at the start
of t is
vt (m) =
∑
m′
λt (m
′,m) vˆt (m
′) ; (11)
the proportion of agents who hold m at the start of t+ 1 is
pit+1 (m) =
∑
m′≥m
(
m′
m
)
(1− δt)
m δt
m′−mp˜it (m
′) . (12)
Notice that (3), (10), and (12) determine the law of motion from the distributions pit
to pit+1; and (4), (9), and (11) determine the recursive relationship between the value
functions vt and vt+1.
Definition 1 Given (pi0, C0, C), a sequence {vt, pit+1}
∞
t=0 is an equilibrium if it satisfies
(3)-(12) all t. A pair (v, pi) is a steady state if {vt, pit+1}
∞
t=0 with vt = v and pit = pi for
all t is an equilibrium.
In an equilibrium, aggregate output at period t is
Yt = 0.5
∑
mb,ms
pit
(
mb
)
pit (m
s) yt
(
mb,ms
)
, (13)
the average payment is
Dt =
∑
mb,ms
pit
(
mb
)
pit (m
s) dt
(
mb,ms
)
,
the average price is
Pt =
∑
mb,ms
pit
(
mb
)
pit (m
s) pt
(
mb,ms
)
,
where dt(m
b,ms) =
∑
dµt(d;m
b,ms) and pt(m
b,ms) = dt(m
b,ms)/yt(m
b,ms). We
define
ϕt+1 =
(
M+t /M
)
Pt+1/Pt − 1
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as the inflation rate, where (M+t /M)Pt+1 is the average price at t+ 1 if there were no
disintegration at the end of t.
Because our interest is in long-run real effects of inflation, below we mainly compare
steady states corresponding to different transfer policies with a steady state correspond-
ing to the benchmark no-transfer policy by quantitative analysis. Given a set of policy
and non-policy parameter values, we compute a steady state (v, pi) such that the value
function v is strictly increasing and concave—a value function is concave if its linear
interpolation is concave. We cannot prove that this sort of steady state is unique for
given parameter values. We experiment with many different sets of parameter pa-
rameter values; for each set, we start from many different initial conditions but our
algorithm always converges to the same steady state. So we refer to the steady state
found by our algorithm as the steady state corresponding to the set of parameter val-
ues. In our quantitative analysis, we fix non-policy parameter values and vary policy
parameter values; the benchmark policy is the no-transfer zero-inflation policy.
We follow Lagos and Wright [16] to pin down the value of the buyer’s surplus θ by
markup. The period-t average markup in an equilibrium is∑
mb,ms
pˆit
(
mb
)
pˆit (m
s)Vt
(
mb,ms
)
/c
(
yt
(
mb,ms
))
; (14)
where Vt(m
b,ms) =
∑
d µt(d;m
b,ms)[vt(m
s+d)−vt(m
s)] and Vt(m
b,ms)/c(yt(m
b,ms))
is the (expected) markup in a meeting between a buyer with mb and a seller with with
ms at period t.4 We identify the value of θ by which the average markup in the
benchmark steady state meets a target; we apply this θ when policy deviates from
the benchmark. An obvious alternative is to identify a different value θ by which the
average markup meets the same target for a different policy; we discuss this alternative
in section 3.
We choose B sufficiently large to mitigate effects of bounding one’s nominal wealth
and M sufficiently large to mitigate effects of indivisibility of money. Through ex-
periments, we find that B = 150 and M = 30 serve the purposes well. We let
the annual discount rate be 4% so that β = 1/(1 + 0.04/F ) when agents meet F
rounds in the decentralized market per year. All results presented in the paper use
(σ, η, ω) = (1, 1, 10−4) (see (1) and (2)) and F = 4; we discuss different parameter val-
ues in section 3. We choose 1.39 as the target of the average markup in the benchmark
steady state, a target that is at the high end of markup values estimated by empirical
studies.5 Given (σ, η, ω) = (1, 1, 10−4) and F = 4, the average markup reaches 1.39 at
θ = 0.98 in the benchmark steady state.
4The seller’s surplus can be written as (V/Q)·Q−C(Q), where V = Vt(m
b,ms), Q = c(yt(m
b,ms)),
and C(Q) = Q; that is, the seller exchanges his present utility loss due to production Q with his future
utility gain due to the monetary payment V under the price V/Q. Treating the seller’s surplus as his
profit, V/Q is the conventional price-marginal cost markup.
5This target is suggested by Lagos, Rocheteau and Wright [15] and also adopted by Jin and Zhu
[13].
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C0 C ϕ ∆Y ∆Ypi D Σ Gini
decentralized
benchmark 0 0 0 0 0 0.21 1.479 0.117
regressive
-0.01 0.01 1% 4.94% 4.32% 0.17 1.564 0.183
-0.02 0.02 2% 11.53% 10.88% 0.15 1.575 0.232
-0.03 0.03 3% 18.97% 20.66% 0.14 1.562 0.277
progressive
0.3 0 1% -2.76% 2.38% 0.76 0.783 0.163
0.6 0 2% -4.59% 5.60% 1.34 0.658 0.205
0.9 0 3% -6.40% 9.20% 1.92 0.599 0.240
centralized
benchmark 0 0 0 0 0 4.98 0.382 0.267
regressive
-0.01 0.01 1% 0.17% -0.003% 4.93 0.381 0.268
-0.02 0.02 2% 0.33% -0.002% 4.87 0.379 0.268
-0.03 0.03 3% 0.49% 0.001% 4.82 0.378 0.268
progressive
0.3 0 1% -3.29% -0.12% 6.71 0.428 0.285
0.6 0 2% -5.86% -0.23% 8.15 0.440 0.303
0.9 0 3% -8.03% -0.38% 9.56 0.421 0.323
Table 1: Steady states under various policy parameters.
3 Real effects of inflation
A government’s transfer policy or, simply, a transfer is regressive if C0 < 0 and pro-
gressive if C0 > 0. In this section, we illustrate that and explain why by examples
(a) regressive transfers imply a much different inflation-output correlation from pro-
gressive transfers and (b) decentralized trade is critical to a positive and significant
output-inflation correlation. In examples we use three inflation targets, 1%, 2%, and
3%; we choose transfer parameters such that each pair (C,C0) leads to a corresponding
ϕ around an inflation target. For regressive transfers, we fix C0/C = −1 (regressiveness
requires C > 0) and set C0 = −0.01, −0.02, and −0.03, corresponding to ϕ = 1%, 2%,
and 3%; for progressive transfers, we fix C = 0 (so each transfer is a lump-sum trans-
fer) and set C0 = 0.3, 0.6, and 0.9, corresponding to ϕ = 1%, 2%, and 3%. By these
examples, we also illustrate and explain why (a’) regressive and progressive transfers
have a similar effect on the distribution of wealth and (b’) decentralized trade is critical
to those effects of transfers on the distributions.
Contrast between regressive and progressive transfers
The upper part of Table 1 reports the relative change in aggregate output ∆Y =
Y ′/Y − 1, i.e.,
∆Y = 0.5
∑
mb,ms
[
pˆi′
(
mb
)
pˆi′ (ms) y′
(
mb,ms
)
− pˆi
(
mb
)
pˆi (ms) y
(
mb,ms
)]
/Y
for each of the three regressive transfers and three progressive transfers in our exercise.
Throughout, we remove the time subscription from an object Xt in an equilibrium
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Figure 1: Steady-state value functions and distributions under (C,C0) = (0, 0) (bench-
mark), (C,C0) = (0.01,−0.01) (regressive transfer), and (C,C0) = (0, 0.3) (progressive
transfer), respectively. Upper: decentralized trade; lower: centralized trade.
to represent that object in a steady state; and when expressing a relative change
of the object from the zero-inflation benchmark to another steady state, we use X
and X ′ to represent the object’s values in the benchmark and the other steady state,
respectively. We can see that regressive transfers give rise to a significant and positive
output-inflation correlation and progressive transfers do the opposite. To understand
why different transfers lead to different output-inflation correlations, we first analyze
how a transfer affects the value function and distribution relatively to the benchmark;
next we explain the relative change in aggregate output caused by the transfer by how
it affects the value function and distribution.
The upper part of Figure 1 displays steady-state value functions and distributions
for (C,C0) = (0.01,−0.01) (ϕ = 1%), (C,C0) = (0, 0.3) (ϕ = 1%), and (C,C0) = (0, 0)
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(ϕ = 0).6
How each transfer reshapes the benchmark value function may be related to the
individual consumption-production risk. The risk stems from idiosyncratic shocks un-
derlying heterogeneity of wealth in the model; curvature of the value function indicates
directly how much an agent is averse to variation in wealth and indirectly how much
the risk is experienced by the agent. Qualitatively, a regressive transfer enhances the
individual risk (as it offers more to an agent when he is rich than when he is poor),
acting on the benchmark value function as if making a concave transformation; a
progressive transfer does the opposite. Quantitatively, we measure the experienced
consumption-production risk in the steady state (v, pi) corresponding to a given policy
by
Σ =
∑
m
pi (m) ς (m) , (15)
referred to as the indirect risk aversion, where ς(m) is the relative risk aversion at
m for a smooth approximation of the function v. The value of Σ is 1.479 at the
benchmark, moving up to 1.564 for (C,C0) = (0.01,−0.01) and down to 0.783 for
(C,C0) = (0, 0.3),
7 as reported in Table 1; those numbers indicate that there is a
substantial risk at the benchmark and that a transfer may change the risk by a great
magnitude. The substantial benchmark risk permits a risk-reducing force to act more
evidently than a risk-enhancing force (the progressive transfer in the upper part of
Figure 1 seems to reshape the value function more).
The direction that the regressive transfer reshapes the benchmark distribution in
Figure 1 is anticipated but, why does the regressive transfer reshape it in the same
direction? This is again related to the individual consumption-production risk. A
transfer has an assignment effect on the distribution—it disperses the distribution if
C0 < 0 and squeezes if C0 > 0; it also has a general-equilibrium expenditure effect
on the distribution—it disperses the distribution if agents tend to spend more and
squeezes if less. A progressive transfer encourages agents to increase their payments
by reducing the risk; a regressive transfer does the opposite. The average payment
is 0.21 at the benchmark, moving up to 0.76 for (C,C0) = (0, 0.3) and down to 0.17
for (C,C0) = (0.01,−0.01), as reported in Table 1. A dramatic change in payments
due to a progressive transfer may be attributed to a great reduction in the risk and,
it easily allows the expenditure effect to be the dominant factor. A far limited change
in payments due to a regressive transfer may be attributed to the fact that payments
are already on a low level at the benchmark and, it renders the dominant role to the
assignment effect.
6The upper part of Figure 1 does not display the value functions over a small neighborhood of
zero. Over this neighborhood, the increments of the value functions for (C,C0) = (0.01,−0.01) and
(C,C0) = (0, 0.3) are close to 400.
7By definition, both the change in the value function and the change in the distribution caused
by a transfer contribute to the change in the indirect risk aversion. But for each steady state, the
standard deviation of ς(m) is no greater than 0.11; that is, the change in the indirect risk aversion is
mostly contributed by and, hence, gives a good indication about the change in the value function.
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Now we can explain why a transfer may cause a certain relative change in aggregate
output. To begin with, let the redistribution effect of the transfer on aggregate output
be defined by
∆Ypi = 0.5
∑
mb,ms
[
pˆi′
(
mb
)
pˆi′ (ms)− pˆi
(
mb
)
pˆi (ms)
]
y
(
mb,ms
)
/Y,
which contributes to ∆Y solely by reshaping the distribution (although the distribution
pˆi is not the same as the distribution pi, the two distributions are altered by the transfer
similarly). As reported in Table 1, regressive and progressive transfers all have positive
and significant redistribution effects. This is in line with a finding in Jin and Zhu [13]
for shot-one transfers; that is, a transfer can increase aggregate output by stretching
the distribution, provided that overall incentives to produce are maintained.
For a one-shot transfer, the redistribution effect contributes to almost all the change
in aggregate output; but this is not the case for repeated transfers because repeated
transfers affect the value function, which determines incentives to produce or, sim-
ply, meeting output. Indeed, a progressive transfer here undercuts incentives in most
meetings because its way of reshaping the value function lowers the incremental values
over most money holdings; a regressive transfer may maintain and even further en-
hance incentives because its way of reshaping the value function in general raises the
incremental values of money. The part in ∆Y complementary to ∆Ypi, i.e.,
∆Yy = 0.5
∑
mb,ms
pˆi′
(
mb
)
pˆi′ (ms)
[
y′
(
mb,ms
)
− y
(
mb,ms
)]
/Y,
is actually the weighted change in incentives, with weights assigned by the distribution
pˆi′.8
Put together, each transfer has a positive redistribution effect but only a regressive
transfer can maintain incentives to uphold this effect. By this reasoning, it is the
risk-enhancing force C0 instead of the inflating force C in a regressive transfer that
induces a positive ∆Ypi and assures a positive ∆Yy. In the Table-1 exercise, the ratio
of C0 to C is fixed among regressive transfers so that the risk-enhancing force increases
with inflation, explaining the positive output-inflation correlation.9 On the other hand,
whether ∆Yy of a progressive transfer dominates ∆Ypi, as all other numbers reported
in Table 1, can only be told by computation; but given the degree that the benchmark
value function is reshaped by the progressive transfer in Figure 1, it is of no surprise
that the transfer has a dominating ∆Yy and a larger C0 undercuts incentives further
more, leading to a more negative ∆Y .
8Recall that the change in pˆi affects the value function v˜ by affecting the disintegration probability.
So strictly speaking, the change in meeting output is contributed by the change in v and the change
in pˆi. But the change in v is the dominant factor because the change in pˆi is mainly to shift the whole
function v˜ down but the change in v affects the incremental values of v˜.
9Notably, it is feasible to increase the risk-enhancing force C0 but decrease inflation with regressive
transfers. For those transfers, our analysis indicates a negative output-inflation correlation. As a
simple example, fix C = 0.01 and decrease C0 from −0.01 to −0.02 and −0.03. As C0 falls, inflation
moves down from 1% to 0.97% and 0.93%, ∆Ypi up from 4.32% to 5.09% and 6.21%, and ∆Y up from
4.94% to 5.93% and 7.10%.
11
1% 2% 3%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
D
ec
en
tr
al
iz
ed
Regressive transfer
99-20 percentile ratio
99-50 percentile ratio
50-20 percentile ratio
1% 2% 3%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Progressive transfer
99-20 percentile ratio
99-50 percentile ratio
50-20 percentile ratio
1% 2% 3%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
C
en
tr
al
iz
ed
99-20 percentile ratio
99-50 percentile ratio
50-20 percentile ratio
1% 2% 3%
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
99-20 percentile ratio
99-50 percentile ratio
50-20 percentile ratio
Figure 2: Selected percentile ratios of the wealth distribution under different inflation
rates generated by regressive or progressive transfers. Upper: decentralized trade;
lower: centralized trade.
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In the last column of Table 1, we report the Gini coefficient for the distribution
of wealth in each of the seven steady states. In Figure 2 (the upper row), we present
three different ratios of percentiles of the wealth distribution, where “a-b percentile
ratio” is the ratio between wealth levels at the ath percentile and at the bth percentile.
Apparently, the model in its current form cannot generate the spread of wealth observed
in the data (which is discussed more in section 5). The model does tell that the spread
of wealth is quite responsive to inflation. Moreover, inflation in the model generates a
trend of the spread of wealth that resembles a key feature observed in data; that is, the
very top gains significantly with respect to the mid class and to the bottom while the
mid class does not gain as much with respect to the bottom. Furthermore, the model
offers a novel lesson that the distribution of wealth may not be a sufficient indicator for
how unequal a society is. Indeed, the difference in the expected lifetime utility at the
two ends of the wealth distribution can either increase or decrease as the distribution
becomes more dispersed.
Role of decentralized trade
To see how decentralized trade contributes to output-inflation correlations, we replace
pairwise meetings with a centralized market where agents take the price of money
φt as given. That is, a trading outcome for an agent carrying m into the market is
(y, µ), meaning that the agent receives y units of goods from the market and pays
to the market d ∈ {0, . . . ,m} units of money with probability µ(d) when he is a
buyer, that he surrenders y units of goods to the market and receives from the market
d ∈ {0, . . . , B −m} units of money with probability µ(d) when he is a seller, and
that the mean of the distribution µ is y/φt. All other aspects of the basic model are
unchanged.
Given the constraint of φt imposed on trading outcomes, equilibrium conditions at
period t are again described by the value function vt+1 and the distribution pit. As
above, pit and (C,C0) fully determine the distribution pˆit; for an agent carrying m into
the market, the surplus Sbt (y, µ,m) from a trading outcome (y, µ) when he is a buyer
and the surplus Sst (y, µ,m) when he is a seller are fully determined by vt+1 and pˆit.
The agent’s trading outcome is
(yat (m) , µ
a
t (.;m)) = argmax
(y,µ)
Sat (y, µ,m) , a ∈ {b, s}. (16)
Market clearing requires∑
m
pit (m)
∑
d
µbt (d;m) =
∑
m
pit (m)
∑
d
µst (d;m) . (17)
Given (pi0, C0, C), a sequence {vt, pit+1, φt}
∞
t=0 is an equilibrium if it satisfies the
recursive relation between the value functions vt and vt+1, the law of motion from the
distributions pit to pit+1, and the market clearing condition (17), all t. A tuple (v, pi, φ)
is a steady state if {vt, pit+1, φt}
∞
t=0 with (vt, pit+1, φt) = (v, pi, φ) all t is an equilibrium.
Details of equilibrium conditions are given in the appendix. Now in an equilibrium,
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aggregate output at period t is Yt = 0.5
∑
m pit (m) y
s
t (m) and average payment is
Dt =
∑
m pit (m)
∑
d µ
b
t (d;m).
The lower part of Table 1 displays output-inflation correlations for the same values
of (C,C0) used in the upper (now ∆Y = 0.5
∑
m[pˆi
′(m)ys′(m) − pˆi(m)ys(m)]/Y for a
transfer). Compared to the correlations in the upper part of the table, the positive
output-inflation correlation with regressive transfers is much weakened and the negative
correlation with progressive transfers is somewhat strengthened. To reveal the force
coming with centralized trade, we first analyze how a transfer affects the value function
and distribution relatively to the zero-inflation benchmark under centralized trade.
The lower part of Figure 1 displays the steady-state value functions and distri-
butions when (C,C0) = (0.01,−0.01), (C,C0) = (0, 0.3), and (C,C0) = (0, 0) with
centralized trade. Those functions and distributions differ from those in the upper
part of the figure in four apparent ways. First, value functions are much less concave
(this may be confirmed by values of Σ as reported in Table 1). Second, distributions
are much more dispersed (e.g., the standard deviation of the benchmark distribution
is 14.33 under centralized trade and 6.23 under decentralized trade). Third, the dis-
tribution is squeezed (relatively to the benchmark) by the progressive transfer, shifted
to the right by the regressive transfer, and is reshaped by either transfer with a much
lesser degree; the lesser degree can also be seen from the Ginis and percentile ratios
(the last column of Table 1 and the bottom row of Figure 2). Lastly, the value function
is reshaped (relatively to the benchmark) on the poor side with a much lesser degree
by the progressive transfer.
Centralized trade make these differences because trading by pairs itself is a source
of idiosyncratic shocks or, the market provides a sort of insurance absent with de-
centralized trade. To elaborate, trade being centralized or not, each agent faces an
idiosyncratic shock that determines his type at each period. But with the competitive
market, y units of goods is exchanged for y/φt units of expected monetary payments;
with pairwise trade, in contrast, how much money y units of goods may be exchanged
for depends on the wealth of his trading partner. Intuitively, the insurance is more
relevant for a poor agent. For, the agent can adjust up his wealth as a seller on the
market according to the price φt by his desire; but trading by pairs constrains the
adjustment by the wealth of his trading partner.
The indirect risk aversion Σ reported in Table 1 does indicate that the market-
provided insurance greatly reduces the individual consumption-production risk, ex-
plaining the first difference indicated above. With this insurance, agents tend to spend
much more (D = 4.98 at the benchmark) and so the distribution becomes much more
dispersed, explaining the second difference. Given that the average payments are al-
ready high, there is little room for the progressive transfer to generate the expenditure
effect on the distribution that may dominate the assignment effect but there may
be some room for the regressive transfer to generate the expenditure effect that may
somewhat offset the assignment effect, explaining the third difference. Finally, the
market-provided insurance weakens the insurance role of and, hence, the reshaping
force on the benchmark value function from the progressive transfer, explaining the
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fourth difference.
By their ways of reshaping the value function, a regressive transfer maintains incen-
tives to produce and a progressive transfer undercuts (as they do under decentralized
trade). By their ways of reshaping the distribution, a regressive transfer should have an
ambiguous and rather small redistribution effect and a progressive transfer should have
a negative and not large redistribution effect (now, for a transfer, the redistribution
effect on aggregate output of a transfer is ∆Ypi = 0.5
∑
m [pˆi
′ (m)− pˆi (m)] ys (m) /Y
and ∆Yy = 0.5
∑
m pˆi (m) [y
′ (m)− y (m)] /Y complementary to ∆Ypi in ∆Y ). In sum-
mary, under centralized trade, the positive output-inflation correlation for regressive
transfers is weakened because the redistribution effects are weakened; the negative
output-inflation correlation for progressive transfers is strengthened because the redis-
tribution effects become negative.
Different parameter values
In Table-1 exercises, we fix values of the meeting frequency F , the risk aversion coeffi-
cient σ in the utility function u, the labor supply elasticity η in the disutility function
c, the constant term ω in u, and the buyer’s surplus weight θ to demonstrate how two
sorts of transfer policies affect output and distribution of wealth under different market
structures. The mechanism behind those correlations is built on three properties of the
model: (a) there is a substantial consumption-production risk at the benchmark; (b)
the risk can be significantly reduced by a progressive transfer; and (c) the risk is sig-
nificantly reduced if decentralized trade is replaced with centralized trade. Intuitively,
those three properties have little to do with F and are robust as long as values of σ, η
and ω do not sufficiently flatten the function u or c; moreover, the value of θ would be
a factor only if it reduces the benchmark risk.
To confirm, we experiment gradually increasing F from 4 to 365, σ from 0.5 to
2, η from 0.5 to 2, and ω from 10−6 to 10−2,10 and θ from 1 to 0.9; the patterns in
Table 1 remain valid in our experiments. Notably, when θ moves down from 1 to 0.97,
the average benchmark markup moves up from 1 to 1.61; over this range, the value
of Σ is decreasing in θ but even at θ = 1, Σ reaches 1.084. The main reason for the
monotonic relationship between Σ and θ may be understood as follows: everything
else equal, a smaller θ results in a higher consumption-production risk by making the
distribution of an agent’s consumption by meeting different sellers and the distribution
of his production by meeting different buyers more diverse.11
Two more comments on θ are in order. First, we fix θ in Table-1 exercises when
policy deviates from the benchmark. Alternatively, we may identify a different value
of θ by which the average markup meets the markup target for a different policy;
10If we interpret ω as home production so that ω/Y is the home production to GDP ratio as in Jin
and Zhu [13], then the range of ω covers the estimated home production to GDP ratios.
11The monotonic relationship is not global. Indeed, there is no risk at all when θ = 0 (as money is
valueless in any equilibrium) and, perceivably, there is less variation in consumption and production
as θ approaches to zero.
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but the values of θ turn out pretty close to 0.98 (e.g., if ϕ = 3% then θ = 0.988
for the regressive transfer and θ = 0.982 for the progressive transfer) and, hence, the
correlations in Table 1 are not affected. Second, our analysis above does not exclude
that ∆Yy may be dominated by ∆Ypi for some progressive transfers. Actually this may
be the case when θ is sufficiently close to 1 and inflation is sufficiently close to zero: θ
matters because everything else equal, a larger value of θ tends to undercut meeting
output less for a same progressive transfer; ϕ matters because ∆Yy/∆ϕ and ∆Ypi/∆ϕ
are not constant in ϕ.
4 The model with nominal bonds
In this section, we focus on policies generating positive output-inflation correlations but
not directly implemented by the section-2 transfer program. To this end, we replace
that transfer program with discount nominal bonds as follows. At stage 1 of period
t, the government issues nominal bonds on a competitive market; each unit of bonds
automatically turns into one unit of money at the start of period t + 1. Each agent
chooses a probability measure µˆ (a lottery) defined on the set Ξ = {ζ = (ζ1, ζ2) :
ζ1, ζ2 ∈ Z+, 1 ≤ ζ1 + ζ2 ≤ B} that satisfies∑
ζ=(ζ1,ζ2)
µˆ (ζ) ·
[
ζ1 + ζ2 (1 + it)
−1] ≤ m, (18)
where m is the amount of money carried by the agent into the market, it is the nominal
interest rate at t (i.e., (1+it)
−1 is the price of bonds) set by the government who stands
to meet any demand on bonds, and µˆ(ζ) is the probability for the agent to leave the
bond market with the portfolio ζ = (ζ1, ζ2) consisting of ζ1 units of money and ζ2 units
of bonds. At stage 2, agents are matched in pairs as in the section-2 model. In each
meeting, each agent can observe his meeting partner’s portfolio, but bonds are illiquid
and money is the unique payment method. After the meeting, the bonds mature and
the money stock is
M+t =Mt + Lt
[
1− (1 + it)
−1] ,
where Lt is the stock of bonds. The interest payments Lt
[
1− (1 + it)
−1] are financed
by inflation; analogous to the section-2 model, each unit of nominal assets (money
and bonds) disintegrates with the probability that restores the nominal stock back to
Mt =M at the end of t.
The equilibrium conditions are described by a sequence {vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0, where vt
and pit are the same as in the section-2 model and pˆit is the distribution of portfolios
right before pairwise meetings at period t. (We need pˆit as a construct independent
from (vt, pit) to deal with that the individual portfolio choice is endogenous.) Now the
value for an agent to hold the portfolio ζ at the end of pairwise meetings is
v˜t (ζ) = β
∑
m′≤ζ1+ζ2
(
ζ1 + ζ2
m′
)
(1− δt)
m′ δt
ζ1+ζ2−m′vt+1 (m
′) , (19)
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annual nominal interest 1% 2% 4% 8% 10%
annual inflation 0.97% 1.93% 3.87% 7.73% 9.67%
output change 1.00% 2.13% 4.75% 11.06% 14.53%
annual real interest 0.03% 0.07% 0.13% 0.27% 0.33%
wealth Gini 0.135 0.152 0.181 0.230 0.250
Table 2: Output-inflation correlation and Fisher effect.
where δt is the disintegration probability given by M
+
t =
∑
ζ(ζ1+ ζ2)pˆi (ζ); the trading
outcome (yt(ζ
b, ζs), µt(ζ
b, ζs)) when a buyer holding ζb meets a seller holding ζs at
stage 2 is determined by (5) with ζb substituting for mb and ζs substituting for ms;
the value for an agent holding ζ right prior to stage-2 meetings is
vˆt (ζ) = v˜t (ζ) + 0.5
∑
ζ′
pˆit (ζ
′)
[
Sbt (yt (ζ, ζ
′) , µt (ζ, ζ
′) , ζ) + Sst (yt (ζ
′, ζ) , µt (ζ
′, ζ) , ζ)
]
;
(20)
and the proportion of agents who hold ζ right prior to date-t disintegration of money
is
p˜it (ζ) = 0.5
∑
ζ′
[
λˆbt
(
ζ, ζb, ζs
)
+ λˆst
(
ζ, ζb, ζs
)]
pˆit
(
ζb
)
pˆit (ζ
s) , (21)
where λˆbt(ζ, ζ
b, ζs) and λˆst(ζ, ζ
b, ζs) are analogous to λˆbt(m,m
b,ms) and λˆst(m,m
b,ms)
in (10). The portfolio choice problem for an agent holding m can be expressed as
vt (m) = max
µˆ
∑
ζ
µˆ (ζ) vˆt (ζ) (22)
subject to (18); letting µˆt(.;m) be the µˆ that solves the problem, then the proportion
of agents holding ζ prior to pairwise meetings is
pˆit(ζ) =
∑
m
µˆt(ζ;m)pit (m) . (23)
The proportion of agents who hold m at the start of t+ 1 is
pit+1 (m) =
∑
ζ1+ζ2≥m
(
ζ1 + ζ2
m
)
(1− δt)
m δt
ζ1+ζ2−mp˜it (ζ) . (24)
Definition 2 Given pi0 and {it}
∞
t=0, a sequence {vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0 is an equilibrium if it
satisfies (19)-(24) all t. If it = i all t, a tuple (v, pˆi, pi) is a steady state if {vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0
with (vt, pˆit, pit+1) = (v, pˆi, pi) all t is an equilibrium.
Quantitative analysis in this section follows the same procedure and adopt the same
parameter values as in section 2. Again the benchmark policy is the one with zero
inflation. Given that interests are all financed by inflation, the nominal interest rate
is zero at the benchmark and inflation increases as the nominal interest rate increases.
Table 2 displays a positive output-inflation correlation similar to the one in the upper
part of Table 1 (note that a period is a quarter so annual nominal interest and annual
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inflation are 4i and 4ϕ, respectively). To make sense of this correlation, notice that
the expected interest payments for an agent who enters the bond market with m units
of money are
[m− g (m)] i = −g (m) i+ im,
where g(m) is the expected amount of money implied by the agent’s portfolio choice.
If g(m)/m is decreasing in m, bonds serve as a regressive transfer. While g(m) is
increasing in m, it has a narrow range: more than 99% of the agents choose g(m) = 1.
Approximating g(m) by a constant, raising i is equivalent to raising C and keeping
C0/C in the section-2 model. Ginis for wealth reported in Table 2 remain to be quite
responsive to inflation. Table 2 also shows a violation of the Fisher effect; that is,
inflation rises less than one-for-one with the nominal interest rate. By definition,
(ϕ− i) (1 + i) = [(L/M)− (1 + i)] .
So if inflation rises on a one-for-one base, then L = (1+ i)M ; that is, all agents should
spend all money on bonds, which is obviously not the case.
One may note that government bonds are not all financed by inflation in reality
and, naturally, may wonder how much this would affect the inflation-output correlation
present in Table 2. As a straightforward experiment, we assume that the government
can extract some taxes from the labor incomes in each pairwise transaction and let the
tax rate τ be such that for some benchmark nominal interest rate, the tax revenues
just cover interests of bonds, i.e., the nominal interest rate at the benchmark is also the
real interest rate. When the nominal interest rate moves above the benchmark rate,
inflation finances the part of interests not covered by the labor taxes. As an exercise,
we choose 1% annual nominal interest rate at the benchmark; this requires τ = 0.491
(notice that the government does not have any other tax revenues). By lowering the
bonds price, the inflation-output correlation is quite similar the one in Table 2.
In what follows, we extend the model with nominal bonds (but without real taxes)
in two directions, each of which is motivated by a specific issue discussed below.
Extension 1: costly market participation
In our model, a seller may be interpreted as a self-employed worker who sells his
product to a buyer or a buyer may be interpreted as an employer who hires a seller to
produce for her. Either way, a seller’s employment status is not a choice variable while
his working hours are.12 But if sellers can choose their employment status, would it
be possible that the employment rate moves little (i.e., the long-run Phillips curve is
nearly vertical) when those who get employed tend to work much more on aggregates?
To address this issue, we follow Rocheteau and Wright [21] to generate unemployment
by a setup of costly market participation.
12The seller may be unemployed if he hits the exogenous bound B on nominal wealth or his meeting
partner does not have money (the mass of agents with wealth B or 0 is negligible). Or, he may be
unemployed if we assume that some meetings are non single coincidence meetings.
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annual nominal interest 1% 2% 4% 8% 10%
annual inflation 0.97% 1.93% 3.87% 7.73% 14.50%
unemployment rate 4.83% 4.85% 4.90% 5.01% 5.08%
output change 0.97% 2.07% 4.60% 10.67% 13.99%
wealth Gini 0.133 0.150 0.178 0.225 0.245
Table 3: Unemployment-inflation and output-inflation correlations
Specifically, after a seller learns his type at stage 2, he enters the decentralized
market with probability ρ by paying the participation cost
k (ρ) = Aρ1+α, (25)
where A and α are positive parameters; the seller is randomly matched with a buyer if
the seller enters the market and is idle in the rest of stage 2 otherwise. The participation
cost is a utility cost; it may include but need not be restricted to utility of leisure
given up for one to travel to his workplace in reality. Now equilibrium conditions are
described by the same sequence {vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0 as given above. For a seller with a
portfolio ζs = (ζs1 , ζ
s
2), his optimal participation choice is
ρt
(
ζ
s
)
=argmax
ρ
ρ∑
ζb
pˆit
(
ζb
)
f st
(
ζb, ζs
)− k (ρ) ,
where ζ
s
≡ ζs1 + ζ
s
2 and f
s
t
(
ζb, ζs
)
is his surplus if he enters the market and meets a
buyer with ζb; notice that the solution to the participation problem depends on wealth
ζ
s
contained in the portfolio ζs but not on the composition of the portfolio and that
as above, the meeting surplus f s
(
ζb, ζs
)
is completely pinned down by vt+1 and pˆit.
Details of equilibrium conditions are given in the appendix. In an equilibrium the
unemployment rate at period t is
Ut = 1−
∑
ζs
pˆit (ζ
s) ρt
(
ζ
s
)
,
and aggregate output is
Yt = 0.5
∑
ζb,ζs
pˆit
(
ζb
)
pˆit (ζ
s) ρt
(
ζ
s
)
yt
(
ζb, ζs
)
.
In quantitative analysis, we target unemployment rate around 4.8% and ρ(0) = 1
at the benchmark. Given non-policy parameter values specified in section 2, the pair
(A,α) in (25) that meets the target is (0.0369, 5), with which the participation costs
are worth of 3% of consumption per period. Table 3 shows a positively-sloped but
rather steep Phillips curve: as annual inflation rises from 0 to 10%, unemployment
rate merely increases from 4.8% to 5.1%. Ginis for wealth are similar to those in Table
2.
To reconcile the Phillips curve and output-inflation correlation in Table 3, let the
redistribution effect on aggregate output of a transfer be defined by
∆Ypi = 0.5
∑
ζb,ζs
[
pˆi′
(
ζb
)
pˆi′ (ζs) ρ˜
(
ζ
s
)
− pˆi
(
ζb
)
pˆi (ζs) ρ
(
ζ
s
)]
y
(
ζb, ζs
)
/Y
19
and let the redistribution effect on unemployment of the transfer be defined by
∆Upi =
∑
ζs
pˆi (ζs) ρ
(
ζ
s
)
−
∑
ζs
pˆi′ (ζs) ρ˜
(
ζ
s
)
,
where ρ˜
(
ζ
s
)
is the solution to the participation-decision problem under the distribu-
tion pˆi′ when the incentive component (i.e., the meeting surplus) in the problem is fixed
at the benchmark value f s
(
ζb, ζs
)
, that is,
ρ˜
(
ζ
s
)
=argmax
ρ
ρ∑
ζb
pˆi′
(
ζb
)
f s
(
ζb, ζs
)− k (ρ) .
As above, for the transfer, let ∆Yy be the part complementary to ∆Ypi in the relative
change in aggregate output ∆Y = Y ′/Y − 1; let ∆Uy be the part complementary to
∆Upi in the change in the unemployment rate ∆U = U
′ − U .
When annual inflation rises from zero to 5%, (∆Y,∆Ypi) = (2.98%, 2.61%) and
(∆U,∆Upi) = (0.12%, 0.10%). Why does ∆Upi differ from ∆Ypi? It helps to first see
why ∆Upi is positive. When a seller enters the decentralized market, the mapping from
the buyer’s wealth to the seller’s surplus is increasing and has a concave shape. So
spreading the distribution lowers the expected surplus for the seller and hence, ρ˜(ζ
s
) is
less than ρ(ζ
s
). This is the main contributor to ∆Upi. Next, we note that the presence
of ρ˜(ζ
s
) and ρ(ζ
s
) in ∆Ypi has little influence on ∆Ypi because the difference between ρ˜
and ρ is of secondary order compared to the difference between pˆi′ and pˆi: the weighted
averages of
∣∣∣ρ˜(ζs)− ρ(ζs)∣∣∣ and |pˆi′(ζ)− pˆi(ζ)| are 0.14% and 1.62%, respectively. This
is easy to understand: the difference between ρ˜ and ρ is a consequence of the difference
between pˆi′ and pˆi as the input to the participation problem.
Why does ∆Uy differ from ∆Yy? By definition,
∆Yy = 0.5
∑
ζb,ζs
pˆi′
(
ζb
)
pˆi′ (ζs)
[
ρ′
(
ζ
s
)
y′
(
ζb, ζs
)
− ρ˜
(
ζ
s
)
y
(
ζb, ζs
)]
/Y.
Recall that when a regressive transfer makes a concave transformation of the value
function, the transforming effect largely falls on agents with below average wealth;
those agents contribute the most of ∆Yy when they are employed sellers because the
transformation gives them incentives to produce more for a fixed amount of payments.
But those sellers contribute little to
∆Uy =
∑
ζs
pˆi′ (ζs)
[
ρ˜
(
ζ
s
)
− ρ′
(
ζ
s
)]
and the reason is simple: they are so eager to work that they tend to choose to
participate in the market with probability close to one, regardless of which incentive
component, benchmark or not, and which distribution component, benchmark or not,
are applied to the participation problem; that is, both ρ′(ζ
s
) and ρ˜(ζ
s
) are almost
identical to unity.
In summary, inflation by altering the distribution of wealth has a negative effect
on the individual seller’s labor participation through an incentive channel (i.e., the
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expected surplus conditional on that the seller enters the market); the change in the
labor participation, however, is of secondary order, compared with the change in the
distribution of wealth itself, in affecting the distribution of matched portfolios, and,
hence, in affecting aggregate output or working hours. On the other hand, while
inflation induces employed sellers to work or produce more through another incentive
channel (i.e., incremental values of money), the strengthened incentives do not translate
into a higher aggregate participation rate because sellers who can be mostly attracted
to participate have already been mostly employed. So even when the employment
status is solely driven by the seller’s or worker’s participation decision, inflation leads
employment and working hours to move in opposite directions and by much different
magnitudes.
In the present extension, we let sellers pay participation costs because this setup
directly deals with the question why the employment rate moves little when those who
get employed tend to work much more on aggregate. Alternatively, we may let buyers
pay the participation costs. Whoever pay the costs, the mechanism for inflation to
affect aggregate output is the same and inflation affecting unemployment is essentially
through affecting the participation rates. Recall that a seller prefers working for a
buyer with average wealth to working for a rich employer or a poor employer by chance.
Analogously, a buyer prefers a seller with average wealth so inflation again lowers the
participation rates by spreading the distribution; thus the alternative setup leads to
unemployment-inflation and output-inflation correlations similar to those in Table 3.13
Extension 2: bond-based money transfer program
Would agents in the benchmark steady state select an inflation policy that increases
aggregate output above the benchmark? While this question pertains to the policy
choice made by heterogeneous agents, it helps to first have a simple statistic that
measures the average welfare of a policy; the statistic is the average expected discount
utility or ex ante welfare
W =
∑
pi(m)v(m) (26)
in the steady state (v, pˆi, pi) corresponding to the policy. Our quantitative analysis
shows that the zero-inflation policy always strictly dominates a regressive policy in
ex ante welfare. This finding is hardly surprising as regressive policies enhance the
individual consumption-production risk. But the finding need not mean a negative an-
swer to the question in concern. After all, ex ante welfare is an aggregate measurement;
moreover, some inflation policies may mix regressive and progressive natures and could
increase ex ante welfare and output at the same time. To proceed, we explicitly intro-
duce such hybrid policies by attaching a money-transfer program to stage-1 purchasing
13Some research suggests that the positive correlation between inflation and unemployment may
go beyond the nearly-vertical range; see Berentsen, Menzio and Wright [2]. We suspect that the
participation cost alone may not be sufficient to induce a more elastic response of unemployment to
inflation in our model.
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of bonds as follows.
The government transfers money to agents in forms of lotteries as in section 2;
what is new here is how much an agent receives depends on his purchasing of bonds.
A transfer policy here is characterized by a pair of non negative parameters (K,λ): if
the lottery chosen by an agent on the bond market is realized as some ζ = (ζ1, ζ2),
then the policy assigns to the agent a lottery µ˜(; ζ); the lottery µ˜(; ζ) has the mean
equal to min{K(1 + λζ2)
−1, B − ζ1 − ζ2} and has the minimal variance (see footnote
1). A transfer policy is active if K > 0 and inactive if K = 0. An active policy is
apparently progressive and, if λ > 0, it further resembles a progressive tax on wealth.
Now equilibrium conditions are described by the same sequence {vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0 as
above while the objective function in (22) is modified as
vt(m) = max
µˆ
∑
ζ=(ζ1,ζ2)
µˆ (ζ)
[∑
z
µ˜ (z; ζ) vˆt (ζ1 + z, ζ2)
]
. (27)
Details of equilibrium conditions are given in the appendix.
For quantitative analysis, we begin with what we refer to as welfare-neutral output-
inflation correlations. Specifically, for a given positive nominal interest rate we seek a
transfer policy just progressive enough to offset the regressive nature of bonds in that
the corresponding steady state delivers the same ax ante welfare as the benchmark
steady state. Because a transfer policy involves two parameters, we fix λ and seek the
suitable value of K, denoted K(i), for each given i > 0. For a given λ, we refer to the
policy (i,K(i)) as a welfare-neutral policy ; denote by ϕ(i) the inflation rate and by Y (i)
aggregate output in the corresponding steady state; let ∆Y (i) = Y (i) /Y −1, where Y
as usual is the benchmark aggregate output; then the welfare-neutral output-inflation
correlation is given by {(ϕ(i),∆Y (i))}i.
Figure 3a displays the welfare-neutral output-inflation correlation for λ = 1. Along
the path of inflation in Figure 3, Ginis for wealth range from 0.147 to 0.233, similar
to those in Table 2. The correlation pattern fits well with the empirical finding in
Bullard and Keating [5]; that is, inflation mildly expands output over a limited range
and the expanding effect gradually phases out beyond this range. This pattern is
representative in that not only the basic reverse U shape is preserved but the peaking
point and magnitude do not move much for other values of λ.
To understand this pattern, we display in Figure 3b value functions with annual
inflation at 0, 1%, and 3% along the correlation in Figure 3a. The main observation
is the following. In partial equilibrium, a rise in i strengthens the regressive feature
of the policy but, in general equilibrium, the rise in K to maintain ex ante welfare at
the benchmark level effectively leads the whole policy (i,K(i)) to perform as a policy
more progressive than the one prior to the rise in i. So when i becomes larger, the
value function becomes more flattened and, consistent with our analysis in section 3,
the distribution becomes more dispersed. In short, progressiveness of policy (i,K(i))
is increasing in i. Consequently, when i is small, a low degree of progressiveness allows
the redistribution effect ∆Ypi to dominate the incentive effect ∆Yy; this dominance is
reversed by a high degree of progressiveness as i grows.
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Figure 3: Output-inflation correlations and value functions associated with welfare-
neutral bond-based money transfers.
For a fixed λ, we may generate many non welfare-neutral correlations by departing
from the welfare-neutral output-inflation correlation. For example, given i, we can raise
K above K(i) to have inflation above ϕ(i) and aggregate output below Y (i); this gives
rise to a correlation along which ex ante welfare is always above the benchmark value
and by controlling the difference between K and K(i), the correlation may resemble
the shape of the welfare-neutral correlation. So, in particular, there is some room for
both ex ante welfare and aggregate output to move above the benchmark values with
inflation over some range. In terms of ex ante welfare, however, we find that an output-
increasing inflation policy is always dominated by one with (i, λ) = (0, 0) and a small
K > 0, i.e., a lump-sum policy; this finding is in line with a finding of Molico [18], who
shows that a lump-sum policy dominates the zero-inflation policy when the buyer’s
surplus weight is unity. Notably, the gain in ex ante welfare by a lump-sum policy
seems limited—the highest ∆W achieved by a lump-sum policy is around 0.29%.14
Regardless of the implied gain or loss being limited or not, ex ante welfare need not
be adequate to reflect an individual agent’s evaluation of a policy. Taking the question
raised at the start of this subsection seriously, we consider how each individual agent
responds to a potential policy change. To this end, let (v, pˆi, pi) denote the benchmark
steady state; let (v′, pˆi′, pi′) denote the steady state corresponding to an alternative
policy; and let {v′t, pˆi
′
t, pi
′
t+1}
∞
t=0 denote the transitional equilibrium connecting the two
steady states, i.e., it starts from the initial distribution pi′0 = pi and converges to
(v′, pˆi′, pi′) as t goes to ∞. For an agent holding m units of nominal wealth, v(m) is
his life-time welfare measured at date 0 if there is no policy change and v′0(m) is his
14The corresponding measurement in consumption units is around 1.31%. We choose to measure
welfare gains in expected utility because it is not obvious how to convert the individual welfare change
δ(m) defined by (28) below into a consumption-equivalent object.
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Figure 4: Changes in individual welfare (δ(m)).
life-time welfare measured at date 0 if the alternative policy is adopted; the relative
change in the agent’s welfare
δ (m) ≡ v′0 (m) /v (m)− 1 (28)
gives a measurement regarding how sensitive the agent is to the policy change.
Figure 4 displays three δ functions for three alternative policies leading to infla-
tion: a regressive policy (K,λ, i) = (0, 0, 3%/4); a welfare-neutral policy (K,λ, i) =
(K(3%/4), 1, 3%/4); and a progressive policy (K,λ, i) = (0.174, 0, 0) giving the highest
ex ante welfare. The figure has three important patterns that are representative for
other policy parameter values. First, no inflation policy wins a majority support; for
a regressive policy, we can always find a hybrid policy and a progressive policy that
have more supporters; for a progressive policy, we can find a hybrid policy that has
almost equal supporters. Second, agents in the middle of the wealth distribution are
not sensitive to which policy is adopted; moving away from the middle, agents become
more and more sensitive; but the change in the individual sensitivity is much more
obvious as moving to the poor end. Third, poor agents are much more disfavoring a
regressive policy than rich agents favoring the policy; and poor agents are much more
favoring a progressive or hybrid policy than rich agents disfavoring the policy.
These responding patterns indicate no simple answer to our question in concern but
they are suggestive in several ways. It may be too naive to only count how many people
favor a policy but ignore how much some people disfavor the policy. Moreover, the
demand for some insurance from the poor side of the society may be a dominant factor
for the social choice even when each agent’s wealth status is transient. Furthermore,
insurance for poor agents served by a progressive policy can be nearly served by a
hybrid policy and, the incremental improvement on poor agents due to a change from
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the hybrid policy to the progressive policy is not in the same degree as the incremental
deterioration on rich agents. So a rationale for an output-increasing inflation policy
may lie in that it reduces the disfavoring degree of rich agents compared with a policy
insuring poor agents.
5 Discussion
While it has never been a mainstream proposition, that inflation may be expansionary
can be at least dated back to Hume,
...[I]t is of no manner of consequence, with regard to the domestic hap-
piness of a state, whether money be in a greater or less quantity. The good
policy of the magistrate consists only in keeping it, if possible, still increas-
ing; because, by that means he keeps alive a spirit of industry in the nation.
[Hume [12, p 173]]
Hume, however, did not spell out why increasing the quantity of money may keep alive
a spirit of industry. Modern economics does offer some answers. In the presence of
capital, the negative incentive effect of inflation on output may be dominated by the
Tobin effect; see Orphanides and Solow [19] for a survey, including the anti-Tobin effect
that strengthens the negative incentive effect and why superneutrality in Sidrauski
[22] may not be robust. Moreover, inflation may be expansionary when agents have
nonstandard preferences; e.g., Graham and Snower [11]. Furthermore, it is well known
that with nominal rigidity, inflation can raise output as in the New Keynesian model;
e.g., Devereux and Yetman [7] and Levin and Yun [17]. In our model, the price is flexible
and preferences are standard and, what kind of correlation would emerge depends on
how inflation assigns wealth among agents, which may help reconcile the difference in
empirical evidence.
It is not a mainstream proposition that monetary policy in general and inflation in
specific would play a major role in shaping inequality in the long run, either. Nonethe-
less three stylized facts in the U.S. economy seem to draw a fair amount of attention
from the literature: poor people conduct higher fractions of transactions by cash; poor
people hold higher fractions of wealth in cash; and only a fraction of households hold
financial accounts. Erosa and Ventura [10] formulate the first heterogeneous-agent
model that endogenizes the first two facts. They assume that some agents are more
productive than other and paying by some non-cash method is more costly than paying
by cash. Inflation is effectively a regressive consumption tax. Motivated by the third
fact, Williamson [27] assumes that some agents cannot receive transfer of money from
the government. As such, inequality grows with inflation. Our study is complementary
to theirs. In our model, inflation can easily be regressive to shift the distribution by a
large degree when agents are ex ante identical, all transactions are paid by money, and
the financial market and money-transfer program are free to access.
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As explained above, our study is capable of offering the novel results because the
individual consumption-production risk is much amplified by the decentralized labor
earning process in our model. Our model above certainly does not include all realistic
aspects that may affect this risk. Three missing aspects are of particular importance.
The first aspect is persistency in the idiosyncratic shock. We may let the productivity of
an agent as a seller be determined by an idiosyncratic shock and the shock follows, say,
an AR(1) process. Such a setting ought to further increase the individual consumption-
production risk.
The second is a social safety net. Within the current setting, we may interpret ω in
the utility function (see (2)) as a universal-consumption subsidy and choose the level of
ω equal to a pre-chosen fraction a of the average consumption (which, by definition, is
equal to the average labor income if we convert the labor income into the consumption
units) in the zero-inflation steady state. If a = 25%, then ω = 0.22 and the risk aversion
Σ is 0.84, sufficient to maintain main patterns of the inflation influence on output and
the distribution. A better picture of how the risk is affected may be obtained in the
presence of some safety net and persistent idiosyncratic shocks.
The third aspect is intrinsic heterogeneity. We may add to the model a small class
of agents who are more productive (as sellers) or more patient or both and, hence, rich
overall. Likely, the addition of the rich class would increase the individual consumption-
production risk for agents in the non-rich class because the non-rich class only occupies
a share of wealth to insure their risks. This conjecture requires some careful check,
together with whether the addition of intrinsic heterogeneity may plausibly improve
the model’s ability to match the degree of inequality observed in data.
Our final remark pertains to the decentralized labor earning process. What is nicely
captured by the Trejos-Wright-Shi model about this process is that the wealth status
of a buyer or employer restricts on earnings of a seller or employee. Our study is a first
step to demonstrate that this feature of the labor-earning process matters a lot in one
modeling environment. It is for the future research to sort out whether this feature
remains to be a powerful factor in other modeling environments.
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Appendix A: Complete description of equilibria
A.1 The basic model
Under a transfer policy (C,C0) in section 2, the expected amount of money received
by an agent holding m units of money is x(m) = min{max{0, C0 + C · m}, B − m}.
Let ⌊x(m)⌋ denote the largest integer no greater than x(m); let ⌈x(m)⌉ denote the the
smallest integer no less than x(m) but no greater than B −m. If ⌈x(m)⌉ 6= ⌊x(m)⌋,
then λt (m
′,m) is defined by
λ (m+ ⌊x(m)⌋ ,m) = ⌈x(m)⌉ − x(m),
λ (m+ ⌈x(m)⌉ ,m) = m− ⌊x(m)⌋ ;
and if ⌈x(m)⌉ = ⌊x(m)⌋, then λt (m
′,m) is defined by
λ (m+ ⌊x(m)⌋ ,m) = 1.
In a stage-2 meeting between a buyer with mb and a seller with ms, the equilibrium
trading outcome µ(mb,ms) implies that
λˆbt(m
b − d,mb,ms) = µ(d;mb,ms),
λˆst(m
s + d,mb,ms) = µ(d;mb,ms),
where d ∈ {0, 1, ...,min{B −ms,mb}}.
A.2 The model with centralized trade
Consider the version of model with a centralized market in stage-2. Given the trad-
ing outcome (yat (m) , µ
a
t (.;m)) (determined by (16)) and the distribution prior to the
market pˆit, the value for an agent holding m right prior to stage-2 market is
vˆt (m) = v˜t (m)+0.5
∑
m′
pˆit (m
′)
[
Sbt
(
ybt (m,m
′) , µbt (m,m
′) ,m
)
+ Sst (y
s
t (m
′,m) , µst (m
′,m) ,m)
]
;
(29)
the proportion of agents who hold m right prior to date-t disintegration of money is
p˜it (m) = 0.5
∑
m′
[
λˆbt (m,m
′) + λˆst (m,m
′)
]
pˆit (m
′) , (30)
where λˆbt(m,m
′) and λˆst(m,m
′) are the proportion of buyers withm′ and the proportion
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of sellers with m′, respectively, leaving the market with m; they are given by
λˆbt(m
b − db,mb) = µb(db;mb),
λˆst(m
s + ds,ms) = µs(ds;ms),
where db ∈
{
0, 1, ...mb
}
and ds ∈ {0, 1, ..., B −ms}.
Given pi0, a sequence {vt, pit+1, φt}
∞
t=0 is an equilibrium if it satisfies (3), (4), (11), (12),
(17), (29), and (30), all t. A tuple (v, pi, φ) is a steady state if {vt, pit+1, φt}
∞
t=0 with
(vt, pit+1, φt) = (v, pi, φ) all t is an equilibrium.
A.3 The model with costly market participation
Given the equilibrium trading outcome (yt(ζ
b, ζs), µt(ζ, ζ
s) between a buyer holding
ζb and a seller holding ζs, f bt (ζ
b, ζs) = Sbt (yt(ζ
b, ζs), µt(ζ
b, ζs), ζb) and f st (ζ
b, ζs) =
Sst (yt(ζ
b, ζs), µt(ζ
b, ζs), ζs) are the surplus of the buyer and the surplus of the seller,
respectively. Given seller’s optimal participation choice ρt(ζ¯
s). The value for an agent
holding ζ right prior to stage-2 (before making the participation choice) is
vˆt (ζ) = v˜t (ζ) + 0.5
∑
ζ′
pˆit (ζ
′)
[
ρt(ζ¯
′)f bt (ζ, ζ
′) + ρt(ζ¯)f
s
t (ζ
′, ζ)
]
− 0.5k
(
ρt(ζ¯)
)
; (31)
and the proportion of agents who hold ζ right prior to date-t disintegration of money
is
p˜it (ζ) = 0.5
∑
ζ′
[
λˆbt
(
ζ, ζb, ζs
)
+ λˆst
(
ζ, ζb, ζs
)]
pˆit
(
ζb
)
pˆit (ζ
s) (32)
+ 0.5pˆit
(
ζb
)
Ut + 0.5pˆit (ζ
s)
(
1− ρt(ζ¯
s)
)
,
where Ut = 1 −
∑
ζs pˆit (ζ
s) ρt
(
ζ
s
)
and λˆbt(ζ, ζ
b, ζs) and λˆst(ζ, ζ
b, ζs) are analogous to
λˆbt(m,m
b,ms) and λˆst(m,m
b,ms) in (10).
Given pi0 and {it}
∞
t=0, a sequence {vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0 is an equilibrium if it satisfies
(19), (31), (32), (22)-(24) all t. If it = i all t, a tuple (v, pˆi, pi) is a steady state if
{vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0 with (vt, pˆit, pit+1) = (v, pˆi, pi) all t is an equilibrium.
A.4 The model with bond-based money transfer program
Under a bond-based transfer policy (K,λ), the expected amount of money transfer
received by an agent with portfolio ζ is x˜(ζ) = min{K(1 + λζ2)
−1, B − ζ1 − ζ2}. Let
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⌊x˜(ζ)⌋ denote the largest integer no greater than x˜(ζ); let ⌈x˜(ζ)⌉ denote the the smallest
integer no less than x˜(ζ) but no greater than B − ζ1 − ζ2. If ⌈x˜(ζ)⌉ 6= ⌊x˜(ζ)⌋, then
µ˜(; ζ) is defined by
µ˜ (⌊x˜(ζ)⌋ , ζ) = ⌈x˜(ζ)⌉ − x˜(ζ),
µ˜ (⌈x˜(ζ)⌉ , ζ) = x˜(ζ)− ⌊x˜(ζ)⌋ ;
and if ⌈x˜(ζ)⌉ = ⌊x˜(ζ)⌋, then µ˜(; ζ) is defined by
µ˜ (⌊x˜(ζ)⌋ , ζ) = 1.
Let µˆt(.;m) denote the µˆ that solves the problem (27), then the proportion of agents
holding ζ prior to pairwise meetings is
pˆit(ζ) =
∑
ζ′
[
µ˜ (ζ1 − ζ
′
1, ζ
′)
∑
m
µˆt(ζ
′;m)pit (m)
]
. (33)
Given (pi0, K, λ) and {it}
∞
t=0, a sequence {vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0 is an equilibrium if it satis-
fies (19)-(21), (24), (27), and (33) all t. If it = i all t, a tuple (v, pˆi, pi) is a steady state
if {vt, pˆit, pit+1}
∞
t=0 with (vt, pˆit, pit+1) = (v, pˆi, pi) all t is an equilibrium.
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